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We consider a quantum key expansion (QKE) protocol based on entanglement-assisted quantum
error-correcting codes (EAQECCs). In these protocols, a seed of a previously shared secret key is
used in the post-processing stage of a standard quantum key distribution protocol like the Bennett-
Brassard 1984 protocol, in order to produce a larger secret key. This protocol was proposed by Luo
and Devetak, but codes leading to good performance have not been investigated. We look into a
family of EAQECCs generated by classical finite geometry (FG) low-density parity-check (LDPC)
codes, for which very efficient iterative decoders exist. A critical observation is that almost all
errors in the resulting secret key result from uncorrectable block errors that can be detected by an
additional syndrome check and an additional sampling step. Bad blocks can then be discarded. We
make some changes to the original protocol to avoid the consumption of the preshared key when
the protocol fails. This allows us to greatly reduce the bit error rate of the key at the cost of a
minor reduction in the key production rate, but without increasing the consumption rate of the
preshared key. We present numerical simulations for the family of FG LDPC codes, and show that
this improved QKE protocol has a good net key production rate even at relatively high error rates,
for appropriate choices of these codes.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd,03.67.Hk,03.67.Ac,03.67.Pp
I. INTRODUCTION
A quantum key expansion (QKE) protocol allows two
parties, Alice and Bob, to expand a shared secret key by
using one-way quantum communication and public clas-
sical communication. Luo and Devetak [1] demonstrated
a QKE protocol, which is derived from the standard
Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD) protocol with post-processing steps involving
the use of entanglement-assisted Calderbank-Shor-Steane
(CSS) codes. The protocol is provably secure from an
eavesdropper, Eve, based on a result by Shor and Preskill
[2].
The QKE protocol has a potential advantage over
QKD, in that the original pair of classical codes con-
sidered need not have the dual-containing property. The
cost is that the parties involved have to pre-share a se-
cret key. The classical codes correspond to entanglement-
assisted quantum error-correcting codes (EAQECCs).
The EAQECC construction is described by the formalism
given by Brun, Devetak, and Hsieh [3].
In the CSS construction of Luo and Devetak’s QKE
protocol, a pair of classical linear codes with good error-
correcting performance is needed. Low-density parity-
check (LDPC) codes are classical linear codes that have
sparse parity-check matrices, and many families of LDPC
codes have been studied and claimed to give good perfor-
mance (see, e.g., [4–10]). There have been several recent
studies on the performance of LDPC codes used for QKD
∗ kungchuh@usc.edu
† tbrun@usc.edu
[11, 12]. In this paper, LDPC codes constructed from fi-
nite geometry (FG) are considered [4, 10], and methods
to incorporate them into the QKE protocol are proposed
and explained. For simplicity, the quantum channel is
modeled by a depolarizing channel. Given a tolerable bit
error threshold ǫ for the generated keys, the goal is to
search for codes that maximize the net key rate for given
channel error parameters.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we first
introduce the QKE protocol of Luo and Devetak. We
then propose modifications to the post-processing steps
to improve performance. In Sec. III, we discuss families
of LDPC codes generated by finite geometry. In Sec. IV,
we discuss simulation results using the improved QKE
protocol from Sec. II and the codes from Sec. III, and we
analyze their performance. In Sec. V, we give conclusions
and suggest possible work in the near future.
The one-dimensional vectors appearing in this paper
should always be considered as column vectors. The vec-
tors are denoted with underlined italic characters, and
the matrices are denoted with boldface italic charac-
ters. The operations + and ⊕ are defined respectively
as component-wise addition and addition modulo 2.
II. QUANTUM KEY EXPANSION
The QKE protocol discussed in this paper is derived
from the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol, using
CSS codes for error correction and privacy amplification.
The CSS code used for a BB84 QKD protocol is derived
from a pair of “dual-containing” classical linear codes.
Most pairs of classical codes do not satisfy this require-
2ment, but such pairs can be found. The dual-containing
property requires thatH1H
T
2 = 0 be satisfied, whereH1
and H2 are the parity-check matrices of the two codes.
The QKE protocol, however, does not require the pair
of classical codes to have the dual-containing restriction.
The idea is to interpret the code as an entanglement-
assisted code rather than a standard quantum code, and
the cost is that the two parties involved must have a pre-
shared secret key that is expanded by the protocol.
In Sec. II A, the structure of entanglement-assisted
codes will be introduced, as well as the notation that will
be used throughout the paper. Section IV reviews the
steps of the QKE protocol proposed by Luo and Devetak
[1]. In Sec. II C and IID, we analyze the post-processing
steps of the QKE protocol and propose improvements.
In Sec. II E, we summarize the improvements of Sec. II D
and give a QKE protocol with enhanced performance
compared to the original QKE protocol.
A. Code construction
This section summarizes the entanglement-assisted
CSS code construction and the matrix structures in-
volved. The notation mentioned here will be used
throughout the later sections.
For i = 1, 2, let Ci be a classical [n, ki, d] code with
parity-check matrix Hi of size (n − ki) × n. Based on
the given pair of classical codes, an [[n, k1 + k2 − n +
c, d; c]] entanglement-assisted quantum CSS code can be
constructed, where c = rank(H1H
T
2 ) is the number of
ebits (or entangled pairs of qubits) needed. This code
can protect m = k1 + k2− n+ c qubits from error. After
this process, we end up with two dual-containing classical
codes C′1 and C
′
2 with “augmented” parity check matrices
H
′
1 and H
′
2. The derivation of H
′
i from Hi is as follows:
For a given pair of H1 and H2, there always exist
nonsingular matrices T1 and T2 such that
T1H1H
T
2 T
T
2 =
(
0(n−k1−c)×(n−k2−c) 0(n−k1−c)×c
0c×(n−k2−c) Ic
)
.
(1)
H
′
i can thus be constructed as follows to assure
that the new codes satisfy the dual-containing property,
H
′
1H
′T
2 = 0.
H
′
i = (TiHi Ji), where Ji =
(
0(n−ki−c)×c
Ic
)
. (2)
Suppose H ′1 and H
′
2 are constructed. There exist bi-
nary matrices E1, F1, E2, and F2 such that the following
four requirements are satisfied:
1. The rows of H ′1 and E1 form a basis for C
′
2.
2. The rows of H ′2 and E2 form a basis for C
′
1.
3. N1 =

H ′1E1
F1

 and N2 =

 F2E2
H
′
2

 are full rank
matrices.
4. N1N
T
2 = I.
The new parity-check matrices H ′i have more columns
than the originalHi. These columns correspond to addi-
tional qubits on the receiver’s side. Before decoding, the
sender (Alice) and the receiver (Bob) share c entangled
pairs. Since Bob’s half of these pairs do not pass through
the channel, they are noise-free.
The syndrome of an error is defined as the error vector
multiplied by the parity-check matrix of the code. For
the code C′1 in our case, the syndrome corresponding to
the error vector e is s = H ′1e. The set of codewords of
the code is the set of all vectors with zero syndromes.
The decoder for the LDPC codes considered in this
paper is a sum-product algorithm (SPA) decoder [13]
that identifies a probable error corresponding to each
syndrome. Based on the decoder, the error set cor-
rectable by the code can be defined. For the code C′1
with parity-check matrix H ′1, one may define such a set
as E ′1 = {F
T
2 s + E
T
2 β(s) + H
′T
2 β
′(s) : s ∈ Zn−k12 },
where β(·) : Zn−k12 → Z
m
2 and β
′(·) : Zn−k12 → Z
n−k2
2
are mappings fixed by the decoder. For every syndrome
s ∈ Zn−k12 , the decoder gives F
T
2 s+E
T
2 β(s) +H
′T
2 β
′(s)
as the probable error. The receiver then corrects this
error on the received codeword to retrieve the original
message.
B. Luo and Devetak’s quantum key expansion
protocol
Let Alice and Bob be the sender and receiver utiliz-
ing the QKE protocol proposed in [1]. The steps of the
protocol are as follows:
1) Alice generates a binary string a consisted of (2 +
3δ)n random bits.
2) Alice generates another binary string α consisted of
(2 + 3δ)n random bits, and she prepares each bit in a in
the Z or X basis according to the corresponding bit in
α. For example, Alice may prepare the bit in a in the
Z basis if the corresponding bit in α is 0, and in the X
basis otherwise.
3) Alice sends the prepared qubits to Bob.
4) Bob receives the qubits, and he generates a binary
string γ consisting of (2 + 3δ)n random bits. Bob then
uses γ to determine in which bases to measure the re-
ceived qubits. To be consistent with the example in 2),
Bob measures the received qubit in the Z basis if the
corresponding bit in γ is 0 and measures in the X basis
otherwise. Let the resulting bit string be b.
5) Alice announces α, and Bob discards the bits in b
where the corresponding bits in γ and α do not match,
that is, the bit locations where they prepare and measure
in different bases. Bob announces which bits he discards.
With high probability, there are at least (1+δ)n bits left;
if not, they abort and restart the protocol.
6) Alice randomly chooses n bits and announces the bit
locations for Bob to extract the corresponding bits. Let
Alice’s resulting string be aˆ, and Bob’s be bˆ. There are
3at least nδ pairs of bits left, and those pairs are used for
channel estimation. Alice and Bob announce those bits
to each other and count the fraction that do not match.
If there are too many errors, they abort and restart the
protocol.
7) Alice attaches the length-c preshared bit string κ
to aˆ. She first computes sA = H
′
1
(
aˆ
κ
)
and announces
it to Bob. She then computes her part of the generated
key, kA = E1
(
aˆ
κ
)
.
8) Bob computes sB = H
′
1
(
bˆ
κ
)
, and his part of the
generated key is kB = E1
(
bˆ
κ
)
⊕ β(sA ⊕ sB).
C. Analysis of QKE post-processing
Consider the procedure of Luo and Devetak’s QKE
protocol formalized in the previous section. The error
correction is performed at the last step 8) where Bob
computes β(sA ⊕ sB). In this case, sA ⊕ sB is the syn-
drome that initializes the decoding. To understand how
the function β(·) is computed, we need to examine its
definition and the matrix structure of the code.
Suppose we start with two LDPC codes with parity-
check matrices H1 and H2 of sizes (n − k1) × n and
(n − k2) × n, and c = rank(H1H
T
2 ). The formalism in
Sec. II A gives two (n+ c)× (n+ c) full rank matrices N1
andN2, each formed by three block-matricesH
′
i, Ei, and
Fi of sizes (n− ki)× (n+ c), (k1 + k2 − n+ c)× (n+ c),
and (n − k(1+i mod2)) × (n + c), respectively. H
′
1 and
H
′
2 are defined as the parity check matrices of the newly
formed entanglement-assisted CSS code. Note that the
two new parity-check matrices need not be low-density
and thus the performance will be poor if one uses them
to run the SPA decoder. However, as seen in Sec. II A,
since the matrix operations transforming Hi to H
′
i are
reversible, the error syndrome with respect to the original
parity-check matrix Hi can be retrieved by doing inverse
matrix operations on the corresponding syndrome with
respect to H ′i. That is, given a syndrome corresponding
to H ′i, we can find the corresponding syndrome for Hi.
As a result, the errors can be decoded by the SPA decoder
with LDPC matrix Hi. The details follow.
The function β(·), which includes the pro-
cess of error correction, comes into the pic-
ture when the error set E1 correctable by the
code H ′1 is defined. Recall from Sec. II A, that
E1 = {F
T
2 s + E
T
2 β(s) + H
′T
2 β
′(s) : s ∈ Zn−k12 }. Since
the matrix N2 formed by H
′
2, E2, and F2 is a full
rank matrix in Z2, the error string corresponding to a
particular syndrome s can be retrieved by the following
steps:
i) Compute s′ = T−11 s.
ii) Run the SPA decoder using the original LDPC
matrix H1 with the syndrome s
′. The decoded string is
the estimated error, and we denote it by eˆ.
iii) Attach c 0’s to eˆ and compute β(s) = E1
(
eˆ
0c×1
)
.
In the above steps i) and ii), the error message can be
decoded using H1 instead of H
′
1 since the last c bits of
the message are preshared by Alice and Bob, and thus the
error message from those bits should always be a string of
0’s. The syndrome is then totally determined by the first
n bits of the error message. This allows us to use the
original low-density parity-check matrices for decoding
and thus the error-correcting performance is maintained.
The last step may not be trivial, and we explain it
in the following. Using our notation, if
(
eˆ
0c×1
)
is cor-
rectable by H ′1 with syndrome s, it is in the set E1 and
can be written in the form
(
eˆ
0c×1
)
= NT2

 sβ(s)
β′(s)

 . (3)
Since N1N
T
2 = I, it is obvious that N
T
2 = N
−1
1 .
N1 can then be multiplied to both sides of the above
equation. As a result,

 sβ(s)
β′(s)

 = N1
(
eˆ
0c×1
)
=

H ′1E1
F1

( eˆ
0c×1
)
. (4)
It should now be clear that step iii) is valid.
D. Improving QKE post-processing
A very important observation based on our simulations
is that in the cases where the channel error rates are not
small, the bit error rates of the resulting keys are sig-
nificant whenever the estimated errors
(
eˆ
0c×1
)
are er-
roneous. Specifically, the bit error rates of the keys are
about half the block error rates for sufficiently large chan-
nel error probabilities. Since β(·) is equivalent to multi-
plying by a matrix, E1, this observation implies that E1
is generally not sparse. Given a block error, it is likely
that each row of E1 and the block error have overlap-
ping non-zero elements, which on average contributes to
a significant number of errors in the key. In other words,
when a block error occurs the resulting key is almost to-
tally randomized.
From the observation above, we can apply two useful
improvements to the protocol.
Improvement 1. This is to check the syndrome fol-
lowing the decoder’s output. This allows the detection
4of not-yet-converged messages from the SPA decoder.
These messages must have block errors. Aborting the
protocol after detecting those erroneous messages greatly
improves the error performance of the generated key, at
the cost of modestly reducing the key rate, since the in-
formation sent through the channel in the prior stages is
wasted.
Improvement 2. This is to check the generated keys
directly. Let the block error rate and bit error rate of the
generated keys be denoted by Rblk and Rbit. Since block
errors of the keys result in a large fraction of the bits
being erroneous in each block, checking several randomly
chosen bits allows a large probability of detecting those
block errors. Let us assume the relationshipRbit = qRblk,
such that, on average, a block error yields a bit error
rate of q. Suppose each time the protocol is processed, a
number of bits µ are chosen randomly from the key, and
are used for a check between the sender and the receiver.
The bit error rate of the generated key, Rˆbit, can then be
calculated as
Rˆbit = Rbit
(1− q)µ
1−Rblk + (1− q)
µRblk
≡ Rbitf. (5)
The bit error rate is scaled by the factor f . For fixed
Rblk, f decreases dramatically as µ increases. This means
that not many bits need be checked to greatly improve
the error performance of the key. To determine µ, we find
the smallest µ satisfying Rˆbit < ǫ, where ǫ is the desired
threshold for the bit error rate of the final key. That is,
µ =
{
⌈log(1−q)(
ǫ(1−Rblk)
(q−ǫ)Rblk
)⌉ if q > ǫ,
0 otherwise.
(6)
Since those randomly chosen µ bits from the key are
revealed, the tradeoff in using this method would be to
reduce the key rate by an amount µ
n
.
A problem arises here, in that the preshared key bits
are consumed even if the protocol fails, which could even
result in the net key rate being negative. However, there
is a way to get around this problem.
In the original QKE protocol, Alice announces to Bob
the message sA = H
′
1
(
aˆ
κ
)
, and Bob corrects the errors
using the syndrome s = sA⊕H
′
1
(
bˆ
κ
)
= H ′1
(
aˆ⊕ bˆ
0
)
.
This syndrome can also be computed by Bob if Alice
sends the message sˆA = H
′
1
(
aˆ
0
)
instead. In this case,
Bob just computes s = sˆA ⊕H
′
1
(
bˆ
0
)
= H ′1
(
aˆ⊕ bˆ
0
)
.
Thus, instead of comparing the keys kA = E1
(
aˆ
κ
)
and kB = E1
(
bˆ
κ
)
⊕ β(sA ⊕ sB) and consuming the
preshared key κ, it is sufficient for the two parties to
compare kˆA = E1
(
aˆ
0
)
and kˆB = E1
(
bˆ
0
)
⊕ β(sˆA ⊕
sˆB). In this way, we can postpone the consumption of
the preshared keys until after the check is performed.
Note that, Alice and Bob must discard the bits from the
final key corresponding to the ones they compare, since
information about those bits is publicly revealed.
E. Summary of the improved QKE protocol
In this section, we will combine the two improvements
from the previous section and assess the improved perfor-
mance of the QKE protocol. We consider the case where
Improvement 1 is performed first, and then Improvement
2 is performed if the check in Improvement 1 is successful.
Let p1 be the failure rate of the check in Improvement
1. Conditioned on passing the check in Improvement 1,
let p2 be the rate of bit errors in the generated keys fol-
lowed by the remaining block errors. Also, let Rblk be
the block error rate of the LDPC code and ǫ be the error
threshold that is desired for QKE. The values, Rblk, p1
and p2, can be determined by simulation. After Improve-
ment 2 is performed, the bit error rate of the generated
key, Rˆbit, can then be calculated:
Rˆbit = p2
(1− p2)
µ
(Rblk − p1)
1−Rblk + (1− p2)
µ (Rblk − p1)
. (7)
To determine µ, we find the smallest µ satisfying
Rˆbit < ǫ. That is,
µ =
{
⌈log(1−p2)(
ǫ(1−Rblk)
(p2−ǫ)(Rblk−p1)
)⌉ if p2 > ǫ,
0 otherwise.
(8)
.
We now outline the improved QKE protocol. Referring
to the original QKE protocol in Sec. II B, the procedure
up to step 6) will be the same. The steps beyond 7) are
modified as follows:
7) Alice computes sˆA = H
′
1
(
aˆ
0
)
and announces it to
Bob.
8) Bob first computes sˆB = H
′
1
(
bˆ
0
)
, and then he
runs the SPA decoder using the original LDPC matrix
H1 with the syndrome s
′ = T−11 (sˆA ⊕ sˆB). Let the de-
coded error string be eˆ.
9) Bob checks if H1eˆ⊕ s
′ is the all-zero string. If not,
the protocol is aborted and they start over. This is a
result of Improvement 1.
10) Alice randomly chooses µ bits from kˆA = E1
(
aˆ
0
)
and announces them to Bob. Bob checks if the corre-
sponding bits from kˆB = E1
(
bˆ⊕ eˆ
0
)
match the ones
sent by Alice. If the strings do not completely match,
5the protocol is aborted and they start over. This is a
result of Improvement 2.
11) Alice computes her part of the generated key as
kA = kˆA⊕E1
(
0
κ
)
, excluding the µ bits corresponding
to the ones they have compared in the previous step.
Bob also computes his part of the generated key as kB =
kˆB ⊕E1
(
0
κ
)
, excluding the µ bits similarly.
The preshared key is only used in the last step. There-
fore, the preshared key will not be consumed if the pro-
tocol is aborted in step 10) or 11). The net key rate of
this improved QKE protocol is
Rnet = (1−Rblk + (1− p2)
µ (Rblk − p1))
m− c− µ
n
.
(9)
We will see how well this does in simulations below.
III. FINITE GEOMETRY LDPC CODES
Finite geometry LDPC codes were formalized by Kou,
Lin and Fossorier [4]. There are four families of FG
LDPC codes: type-1 Euclidean geometry (EG1) LDPC
codes, type-2 Euclidean geometry (EG2) LDPC codes,
type-1 projective geometry (PG1) LDPC codes, and
type-2 projective geometry (PG2) LDPC codes. These
classical FG LDPC codes were used by Hsieh, Yen and
Hsu to construct EAQECCs with good performance that
use relatively little entanglement [10]. In this section, we
briefly restate the results from [4] and [10] and introduce
the construction of FG LDPC codes.
A. Euclidean geometry (EG) LDPC codes
Let EG(p, 2s) be a p-dimensional Euclidean geometry
over the Galois field GF(2s), where p, s ∈ N. This ge-
ometry consists of 2ps points, where each is a p-tuple
over GF(2s). The all-zero p-tuple is defined as the ori-
gin. Those points form a p-dimensional vector space
over GF(2s). A line in EG(p, 2s) is a coset of a one-
dimensional subspace of EG(p, 2s), and each line consists
of 2s points. There are 2(p−1)s(2ps − 1)/(2s − 1) lines.
Each line has 2(p−1)s − 1 lines parallel to it. Each point
is intersected by (2ps − 1)/(2s − 1) lines.
Let GF(2ps) be the extension field of GF(2s). Each el-
ement in GF(2ps) can be represented as a p-tuple over
GF(2s), and hence a point in EG(p, 2s). Therefore,
GF(2ps) may be regarded as the Euclidean geometry
EG(p, 2s). Let α be a primitive element of GF(2ps).
Then 0, α0, α1, α1, ..., α2
ps−2 represent the 2ps points of
EG(p, 2s).
Let HEG1(p, s) be a matrix over GF(2). The rows
of HEG1(p, s) are the incidence vectors of all the lines in
EG(p, 2s) not passing through the origin. The columns of
HEG1(p, s) are the 2
ps−1 non-origin points of EG(p, 2s),
and the ith column corresponds to the point αi−1. Then
HEG1(p, s) consists of n = 2
ps − 1 columns and J =
(2(p−1)s−1)(2ps−1)/(2s−1) rows, and it has the following
structure:
1. Each row has weight ρr = 2
s.
2. Each column has weight ρc = (2
ps− 1)/(2s− 1)− 1.
3. Any two columns have at most one 1-component in
common.
4. Any two rows have at most one 1-component in
common.
The density of HEG1(p, s) is 2
s/(2ps − 1), which is
small for p or s large. Then HEG1(p, s) is a low-density
matrix.
The LDPC code with parity-check matrix HEG1(p, s)
is called a type-1 Euclidean geometry LDPC code, and
we denote it by EG1(p, s).
Let HEG2(p, s) = HEG1(p, s)
T . Then HEG2(p, s) is a
matrix with 2ps−1 rows and (2(p−1)s−1)(2ps−1)/(2s−1)
columns. The rows of HEG2(p, s) are the non-origin
points of EG(p, 2s), and the columns are the lines in
EG(p, 2s) not passing through the origin, and it has the
following structure:
1. Each row has weight ρr = (2
ps − 1)/(2s − 1)− 1.
2. Each column has weight ρc = 2
s.
3. Any two columns have at most one 1-component in
common.
4. Any two rows have at most one 1-component in
common.
The LDPC code with parity-check matrix HEG2(p, s)
is called a type-2 Euclidean geometry LDPC code, and
we denote it by EG2(p, s).
B. Projective geometry (PG) LDPC codes
Let GF(2(p+1)s) be the extension field of GF(2s). Let
α be a primitive element of GF(2(p+1)s). Let n =
(2(p+1)s−1)/(2s−1) and η = αn. Then η has order 2s−1,
and the 2s elements 0, η0, η1, η2, ..., η2
s−2 form all the ele-
ments of GF(2s). Consider the set {α0, α1, α2, ..., αn−1},
and partition the non-zero elements of GF(2(m+1)s) into
n disjoint subsets {αi, ηαi, η2αi, ..., η2
s−2αi}, for i ∈
{0, 1, ..., n− 1}. Each such set is represented by its first
element (αi), for i ∈ {0, 1, ..., n− 1}.
If each element in GF(2(p+1)s) is represented as a
(p + 1)-tuple over GF(2s), then (αi) consists of 2s − 1
(p + 1)-tuples over GF(2s). The (p + 1)-tuple over
GF(2s) that represents (αi) can be regarded as a point
in a finite geometry over GF(2s). Then the points
(α0), (α1), (α2), ..., (αn−1) form a p-dimensional projec-
tive geometry over GF(2s), denoted PG(p, 2s). (Note
that a projective geometry does not have an origin.)
Let HPG1(p, s) be a matrix over GF(2). The rows
of HPG1(p, s) are the incidence vectors of all the lines
in PG(p, 2s). The columns of HPG1(p, s) are the n
points of PG(p, 2s), and the ith column corresponds
to the point (αi−1). Then HPG1(p, s) consists of n =
(2(p+1)s − 1)/(2s − 1) columns and J = (2ps + ...+ 2s +
61)(2(p−1)s + ... + 2s + 1)/(2s + 1) rows, and it has the
following structure:
1. Each row has weight ρr = 2
s + 1.
2. Each column has weight ρc = (2
ps − 1)/(2s − 1).
3. Any two columns have at most one 1-component in
common.
4. Any two rows have at most one 1-component in
common.
The density of HPG1(p, s) is (2
2s − 1)/(2(p+1)s − 1),
which is small for p or s large. Then HPG1(p, s) is a
low-density matrix.
The LDPC code with parity-check matrix HPG1(p, s)
is called a type-1 projective geometry LDPC code, and
we denote it by PG1(p, s).
Let HPG2(p, s) = HPG1(p, s)
T . Then HPG2(p, s) is a
matrix with (2(p+1)s − 1)/(2s − 1) rows and (2ps + ... +
2s+1)(2(p−1)s+...+2s+1)/(2s+1) columns. The rows of
HPG2(p, s) are the points of PG(p, 2
s), and the columns
are the lines in PG(p, 2s), and it has the following struc-
ture:
1. Each row has weight ρr = (2
ps − 1)/(2s − 1).
2. Each column has weight ρc = 2
s + 1.
3. Any two columns have at most one 1-component in
common.
4. Any two rows have at most one 1-component in
common.
The LDPC code with parity-check matrix HPG2(p, s)
is called a type-2 projective geometry LDPC code, and
we denote it by PG2(p, s).
C. Extension of finite geometry LDPC codes by
column and row splitting
A finite geometry LDPC code with n columns and J
rows can be extended by splitting each column of its
parity-check matrixH into multiple columns. If the split-
ting is done properly, very good extended finite geometry
LDPC codes can be obtained.
Let g
1
, g
2
, ..., g
n
be the columns of H . Let csp be the
column splitting factor, csp ∈ {1, 2, ..., ρc}. Then the
column splitting can be done by splitting each g
i
into csp
columns g
i,1
, g
i,2
, ..., g
i,csp
, and distribute the 1’s of the
original column among the new columns accordingly, so
that the columns g
i,1
, g
i,2
, ..., g
i,ρc−csp⌊
ρc
csp
⌋
have weights
ρc
csp
+ 1, and the other columns have weights ρc
csp
.
After column splitting, we can proceed with row split-
ting, that is, determine a row splitting factor rsp ∈
{1, 2, ..., ρr} and follow similarly the process of column
splitting.
We denote by EG1(p, s, csp, rsp) the LDPC code con-
structed by an EG1(p, s) LDPC code with column
and row splitting factors csp and rsp. The codes
EG2(p, s, csp, rsp), PG1(p, s, csp, rsp), PG2(p, s, csp, rsp)
are defined similarly.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulation results of our
QKE protocol with FG codes. We use the same
LDPC code for both C1 and C2 in constructing the
entanglement-assisted CSS code for our QKE protocol.
The channel for quantum communication is assumed to
be a depolarizing channel, and the channel error prob-
ability Pe in the simulation corresponds to that of the
equivalent classical binary-symmetric channel (BSC). We
use Monte Carlo simulation with a sample size of 200 000
for each Pe. We allow the SPA decoder to iterate a max-
imum of 100 times.
The first group of FG codes we demonstrate is the
family of two-dimensional type-1 PG LDPC codes with-
out splitting. These PG1(2, s, 1, 1) codes require only 1
bit of entanglement per codeword as was proven by Hsieh
etal. [10] Therefore, it is possible to implement QKE with
only 1 bit of preshared secret key. The other families
of FG codes we consider are the EG1(2, 5, csp, rsp) and
PG1(2, 5, csp, rsp) codes.
A. PG1(2, s, 1, 1) codes
For the PG1(2, s, 1, 1) codes that require only 1 bit of
preshared key, we consider the equivalent BSC bit error
probabilities ranging from 0% to 8% in steps of 0.5%. Let
[[n,m; c]] be the parameters of the entanglement-assisted
code, and Rnet be the original net key rate of QKE using
that code; that is, Rnet =
m−c
n
. This means that the
QKE protocol expands a key of length c to a key of length
m. Table I demonstrates all possible PG1(2, s, 1, 1) codes
that have block length n ≤ 10 000.
TABLE I. List of PG1(2, s, 1, 1) codes that have block length
n ≤ 10 000.
s [[n,m; c]] Rnet
2 [[21, 2; 1]] 0.0476
3 [[73, 18; 1]] 0.2329
4 [[273, 110; 1]] 0.3993
5 [[1057, 570; 1]] 0.5383
6 [[4161, 2702; 1]] 0.6491
In Fig. 1, we show the QKE performance of the origi-
nal protocol, in terms of bit error rate, of the codes from
Table I. In Fig. 2, we set the generated keys’ bit error
threshold to ǫ = 10−6, and simulate QKE with the im-
proved QKE protocol from Sec. II. We present the per-
formance, in terms of net key rate, using the codes from
Table I.
The results from Fig. 2 show that it is possible to use
just 1 bit of preshared key for QKE even when the chan-
nel is moderately noisy up to a bit error probability of
8%. In addition, the codes that are considered have rea-
sonable block sizes, and therefore the QKE protocol can
be efficiently implemented.
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Bit error rate of the keys generated by
the original QKE protocol with the PG1(2, s, 1, 1) codes from
Table I.
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Net key rate of the improved QKE
protocol with the PG1(2, 5, csp, rsp) codes from Table I. The
error threshold is set to ǫ = 10−6.
B. EG1(2, 5, csp, rsp) and PG1(2, 5, csp, rsp) codes
For the simulation of the EG1(2, 5, csp, rsp) and
PG1(2, 5, csp, rsp) codes, we consider the equivalent BSC
bit error probabilities ranging from 2% to 8% in steps of
0.5%. Since many codes perform well when Pe is small,
we are mostly interested in codes that have good per-
formance for higher Pe, such as might occur in realistic
experiments. For a code to serve the purpose of perform-
ing key “expansion,” one requires Rnet to be positive.
Table II lists all possible EG1(2, 5, csp, rsp) codes with
positive Rnet that have block length n ≤ 11 000. In
Fig. 3, we show the QKE performance of the original
protocol, in terms of bit error rate, of some codes from
Table II.
In Fig. 4, we set the generated keys’ bit error threshold
to ǫ = 10−6, and simulate QKE with the improved QKE
protocol from Sec. II. We present the performance, in
terms of net key rate, using some codes from Table II.
Table III lists all possible PG1(2, 5, csp, rsp) codes with
positive Rnet that have block length n ≤ 11 000. In
TABLE II. List of EG1(2, 5, csp, rsp) codes with positive net
key rates that have block length n ≤ 11 000.
[[n,m; c]] csp rsp Rnet
[[1023, 571; 32]] 1 1 0.5269
[[2046, 452; 450]] 2 1 0.0010
[[3069, 2045; 1022]] 3 1 0.3333
[[4092, 3068; 1020]] 4 1 0.5005
[[4092, 2038; 2034]] 4 2 0.0010
[[5115, 4091; 1022]] 5 1 0.6000
[[5115, 3067; 2044]] 5 2 0.2000
[[6138, 5114; 1022]] 6 1 0.6667
[[6138, 4090; 2044]] 6 2 0.3333
[[7161, 6137; 1022]] 7 1 0.7143
[[7161, 5115; 2046]] 7 2 0.4286
[[7161, 4092; 3069]] 7 3 0.1429
[[8184, 7152; 1012]] 8 1 0.7502
[[8184, 6138; 2042]] 8 2 0.5005
[[8184, 5115; 3067]] 8 3 0.2502
[[8184, 4094; 4082]] 8 4 0.0015
[[9207, 8181; 1020]] 9 1 0.7778
[[9207, 7161; 2046]] 9 2 0.5556
[[9207, 6134; 3065]] 9 3 0.3333
[[9207, 5115; 4092]] 9 4 0.1111
[[10230, 9202; 1018]] 10 1 0.8000
[[10230, 8182; 2044]] 10 2 0.6000
[[10230, 7160; 3068]] 10 3 0.4000
[[10230, 6132; 4086]] 10 4 0.2000
0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.0810
−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
Channel Error Probability, Pe
Bi
t E
rro
r R
at
e
 
 
EG1(2,5,5,2)
EG1(2,5,6,2)
EG1(2,5,7,2)
EG1(2,5,7,3)
EG1(2,5,8,2)
EG1(2,5,8,3)
EG1(2,5,9,2)
EG1(2,5,9,3)
EG1(2,5,9,4)
EG1(2,5,10,3)
EG1(2,5,10,4)
FIG. 3. (Color online) Bit error rate of the keys gener-
ated by the original QKE protocol with selected codes from
EG1(2, 5, csp, rsp).
Fig. 5, we present the QKE performance of the original
protocol, in terms of bit error rate, of some codes from
Table III.
In Fig. 6, we set the generated keys’ bit error threshold
to ǫ = 10−6 and simulate QKE with the improved QKE
protocol proposed in Sec. II. We present the performance,
in terms of net key rate, using some codes from Table III.
Note that for channel error rates less than 2%, we may
consider the code PG1(2, 5, 9, 2), which has a net key rate
of about 0.5556. Considering channel error rates much
lower than 2%, we can use other codes in the family which
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Net key rate of the improved QKE
protocol with selected codes from EG1(2, 5, csp, rsp) and error
threshold ǫ = 10−6.
TABLE III. List of PG1(2, 5, csp, rsp) codes with positive net
key rates that have block length n ≤ 11 000.
[[n,m; c]] csp rsp Rnet
[[1057, 570; 1]] 1 1 0.5383
[[2114, 490; 488]] 2 1 0.0009
[[3171, 2112; 1055]] 3 1 0.3333
[[4228, 3172; 1056]] 4 1 0.5005
[[4228, 2114; 2112]] 4 2 0.0005
[[5285, 4227; 1056]] 5 1 0.6000
[[5285, 3171; 2114]] 5 2 0.2000
[[6342, 5284; 1056]] 6 1 0.6667
[[6342, 4228; 2114]] 6 2 0.3333
[[7399, 6341; 1056]] 7 1 0.7143
[[7399, 5285; 2114]] 7 2 0.4286
[[7399, 4227; 3170]] 7 3 0.1429
[[8456, 7399; 1055]] 8 1 0.7502
[[8456, 6342; 2112]] 8 2 0.5002
[[8456, 5286; 3170]] 8 3 0.2502
[[8456, 4229; 4227]] 8 4 0.0002
[[9513, 8455; 1056]] 9 1 0.7778
[[9513, 7399; 2114]] 9 2 0.5556
[[9513, 6342; 3171]] 9 3 0.3333
[[9513, 5284; 4227]] 9 4 0.1111
[[10570, 9511; 1055]] 10 1 0.8000
[[10570, 8456; 2114]] 10 2 0.6000
[[10570, 7399; 3171]] 10 3 0.4000
[[10570, 6342; 4228]] 10 4 0.2000
have even larger net key rates.
Finally, in Fig. 7, we set the generated keys’ bit error
threshold to ǫ = 10−6, and we present the QKE net rate
using the codes from Tables I, II, and III that perform
the best in each channel error region within 2% to 8%. As
can be seen, quite reasonable key rates can be achieved
even for error probabilities above 7%.
It is worthwhile comparing our results to the recent
work by Elkouss, Leverrier, Alle´aume and Boutros [12].
In their work, a set of nine irregular LDPC codes were
found for QKD based on the BB84 protocol. With a bit
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Bit error rate of the keys gener-
ated by the original QKE protocol with selected codes from
PG1(2, 5, csp, rsp).
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Net key rate of the improved QKE
protocol with selected codes from PG1(2, 5, csp, rsp) and error
threshold ǫ = 10−6.
0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.080
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Channel Error Probability, Pe
QK
E 
Ne
t K
ey
 R
at
e
 
 
PG1(2,4,1,1)
PG1(2,5,7,2)
PG1(2,5,8,2)
PG1(2,5,9,2)
PG1(2,5,9,3)
PG1(2,5,10,3)
PG1(2,5,10,4)
EG1(2,5,8,3)
EG1(2,5,9,4)
FIG. 7. (Color online) Net key rate of the improved QKE
protocol with selected codes from both EG1(2, 5, csp, rsp) and
PG1(2, 5, csp, rsp) that perform well in the various channel
error regions.
9error rate threshold of the generated keys on the same
order as ours (1.5 × 10−6 in their case), their net key
rate performance exceeds ours by roughly 15% − 20%
over the same channel error regions. However, this is
not too surprising, since they consider LDPC codes with
very large block sizes (on the order of 106 bits), while
ours have much more modest block sizes (on the order of
103). We believe the sizes of our codes are reasonable for
practical use. Given much greater computing resources
for postprocessing, it should be easy to construct very
large codes in our family of LDPC codes that would have
better net key rates.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a protocol for QKE
that is an improved version of the protocol proposed by
Luo and Devetak. The modifications are done to filter
out block errors, which allows us to greatly reduce the
bit error rate of QKE with only a small reduction in
the net key rate. In addition, we have studied a family of
LDPC codes based on finite geometry that are capable of
protecting the QKE protocol from errors even when the
channel is moderately noisy. The figures in the previous
section show clearly which codes one should choose to
efficiently expand the keys.
In the near future we will investigate other families of
codes for this QKE protocol. The LDPC codes generated
by finite geometry are a rich family. Besides the family of
FG codes constructed by the method of column and row
splitting, we have also examined several codes in a family
of quasi-cyclic FG LDPC codes [9, 14] that perform well
for our QKE protocol. Another possible task is to further
enhance the QKE protocol. For example, the matrix E1
is not unique. If we have a way to search for an E1
having density as low as possible, then the block error
rate of the code may not affect the bit error rate of the
key by as much.
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